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Abstract: Following Lewis, it is widely held that branching worlds
di¤er in important ways from diverging worlds. There is, however, a
simple and natural semantics under which ordinary sentences uttered
in branching worlds have much the same truth values as they con-
ventionally have in diverging worlds. Under this semantics, whether
branching or diverging, speakers cannot say in advance which branch
or world is theirs. They are uncertain as to the outcome. This same
semantics ensures the truth of utterances typically made about quan-
tum mechanical contingencies, including statements of uncertainty,
if the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is true. The in-
coherence problemof the Everett interpretation, that it can give no
meaning to the notion of uncertainty, is thereby solved.
1 Introduction
The Everett or many-worlds theory of quantum mechanics (EQM) has been
much criticized on the ground that it can make no sense of talk of uncertainty,
and hence has no place for the notion of chance (the incoherence problem:
Greaves [2004], Lewis [2007]. Baker [2007]). This need not prove fatal to EQM,
as there may be other attitudes to future contingencies, other than epistemic,
which motivate behaviour in much the same way, and indeed by the same rules
as maximizing expected utility and Bayesian updating (Greaves [2004], Greaves
[2007], Greaves and Myrvold [2007]). But that is to add an additional twist to
a theory that is already, to put it mildly, conceptually challenging.
We shall say no more of the prospects for EQM on this strategy, for we claim
that the incoherence problem can be solved, in the following sense: there is a
ready set of semantic rules according to which our actual extant, ordinary talk
of ignorance and uncertainty comes out as true, whether in accordance with
conventional quantum mechanics (including the measurement postulates) or in
EQM. The rules are simple; they are also conservative, even to the point that
they can be stated in a way which is neutral between many- and single-world
theories. In the single-world case they are banalities. There is no reason, if
EQM is true, to reject or amend them.
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This is not to say that EQM has no impact on other everyday beliefs, and
certainly not that it has no impact on theoretical beliefs, among them metaphys-
ical beliefs. It will be no surprise if the semantics we are proposing is contested
on metaphysical grounds say on the grounds of a metaphysical theory of ref-
erence, or a metaphysics of time, or of personal identity, or of modality. But to
this our reply is that we are not proposing a metaphysical theory, but a man-
ual of translation, in something like Quines sense: the standard of correctness
is set by uency of discourse and the principle of charity, not by metaphysical
principles; by its serviceability to our best physical theory. That theory is EQM.
Of course, in a certain sense, EQM is also a metaphysical theory, for at the
crudest level it just is a theory of branching universes it describes a set of
branching worlds, of a sort explicitly considered (although rejected) by Lewis in
his On the Plurality of Worlds. It will be convenient, in fact, to begin with Lewis
metaphysics, for it sets out the central questions well enough. Specically, we
begin with the topic of personal identity, and branching within a world.
2 Metaphysics
2.1 Personal ssion
Part, in his Reasons and Persons, posed a famous challenge to the concept
of personal identity. He argued that in certain scenarios there can be no good
answer to the question which person am I. These scenarios involved personal
ssion: processes whereby persons, using various speculative procedures, are
divided into two (at its crudest, by a surgical procedure). His point was that the
concept of personal identity breaks down in such problem cases, so it cannot be
judged fundamental. As such, it should not play a foundational role in theories
of ethics.
Against this, Lewis [1976] argued that personal ssion poses no particular
problem to the concept of personal identity. There may be threats from other
quarters, but he was able to show how the identity relation can be extended
in a conservative way to branching without ambiguity or change in its formal
properties. The trick was to suppose in the face of branching, say into two,
that there are two persons present all along persons who initially overlap or
coincide. This is equivalent to the stipulation that by person, roughly speaking,
we mean a unique cradle-to-grave continuant, specically a unique spacetime
worm. As for the meaning of overlapping, there are plenty of homely analogies:
the Chester A. Arthur Parkway, he observed, overlaps with Route 137 for a brief
stretch, but still there are two roads.
But as the spatial illustration shows, there are also times when we want to
say that there is only one thing present for example, when saying how many
roads, burdened as you are with the shopping, you have to cross to get to the
other side. Even more so in the temporal case: surely we want to say, prior
to branching, that there is only one person present. The matter seems context
dependent, where the context is set by local or global concerns: xing on the
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local state of a¤airs, we should say there is one road (one stretch of road) or
one person present (one common stretch of persons), whereas considering the
global situation, we should say there are two. Local, spatially, means we count
the roads as identical at x i¤ they share a spatial part at position x; temporally,
suggested Lewis, we should count continuants C1 and C2 as identical at t i¤ they
share the same temporal part at time t. The latter he called tensed identity.
Lewis, we believe, was on to something, but it has to be admitted that
his answer to Part has won few supporters. It seems to have come unstuck, in
particular, when it comes to the question of what overlapping persons should say
of events on di¤erent branches (Part [1976]). But here it seems his argument
took a wrong turn, rather than that it was in principle wrong-headed. For Lewis
went on to attribute thoughts (and we must suppose utterances) at time t to
the common temporal parts of speakers at time t. In the absence of branching,
utterances are naturally attributed to persons, which, from a four-dimensional
point of view, are either continuants or stages. To attribute them to stages,
whilst insisting that persons are continuants, seems perverse.
If persons are continuants, we do better to attribute thoughts and utterances
at t to continuants C at t. That is, thoughts or utterances are attributed to
ordered pairs hC; ti or slices of persons hC;Si, S 2 C, not to temporal parts S.
This is to apply whether or not there is branching. In the absence of branching
we obtain the standard worm-theory view; in the presence of branching we
conclude that there are two or more thoughts or utterances expressed at t, one
for each of the continuants that overlap at that time.
Is it to be objected that thoughts or utterances have an irreducibly local
signicance? We may grant the point that their tokenings are purely local
events and as such, indeed, are identical but the content of thoughts and
utterances is another thing altogether. On even the most timid forms of exter-
nalism, or functionalism for that matter, meanings are context-dependent. The
sentences produced pre-branching are likely to play di¤erent semantic roles for
each person subsequently, and likewise their component terms.
This point suggests wide latitude when it comes to the context-dependence
of personal pronouns. Here one might make a case for a variety of di¤erent
semantic rules, but the one we are interested in is this: the word I refers to
the speaker of any sentence in which it occurs. In the non-branching case, this
rule is a banality.
Lewis ruled out this semantics with little or no argument indeed, he did not
even consider it explicitly o¤ering instead one of his own. Suppose continuants
C1 and C2 share the temporal part S at t, and suppose C1 dies shortly after
branching, whilst C2 survives. Then, said Lewis, C1 and C2 cannot share the
straight-forward commonsensical desire that he himself survive, because
The shared stage S does the thinking for both of the continuants
to which it belongs. Any thought it has must be shared. It cannot
desire one thing on behalf of C1 and another on behalf of C2. If it
has an urgent, self-interested desire for survival on the part of C1,
that very thought must also be an urgent, self-interested (and not
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merely benevolent) desire for survival on the part of C2. It is not
possible that one thought should be both. So it is not possible for S
to have such a desire on behalf of C1. So it is not possible for C1 at t
to have the straight-forward commonsensical desire that he himself
survive. (Lewis 1976 p. 74).
True enough, if there is only one thought. But why not if there are two, as follows
if the referent of I myself, thought or uttered at time t (at temporal part S) is
the continuant who thinks or utters the phrase, as in the non-branching case?
Lewis is driving at the conclusion that since the straight-forward desires are not
to be had, we should settle for something not so commonsensical, on e.g. the
desire let at least one of us survive(what he calls weak survival). But the
more conservative option is surely more attractive: why not allow that C1 and
C2 each desires to survive? And look at what each of them says: I will survive,
on our proposed semantics, will be true in C1s mouth, false in C2s, but since
there is nothing to distinguish them prior to branching, neither one can know
the truth value of what he says, for neither one can know which of C1 and C2
he is.
The knowledge each of them lacks is evidently self-locating knowledge, what
Lewis called knowledge de se; each may know everything there is to know, when
it comes to knowledge de dicto propositional content and yet, like Perrys
amnesiac lost in the library at Stanford, each does not know whom he is. Unlike
in Perrys example, however, it is impossible for either to know short of the
moment of death which person (unique continuant) he is.
We conclude: on this semantics, in the example Lewis considers, neither C1
nor C2 at t can know if he will survive. Each at time t should say he is uncertain
if he will survive.
2.2 Branching worlds
Notice that on our semantics talk of branching persons is in many cases the
same a number of sentences have the same truth values as were they diverg-
ing, rather than branching. Divergenceis Lewisterm for continuants (whether
persons, things, or worlds) which are spatiotemporally disjoint, but which for
some initial segment are intrinsically, qualitatively, the same. Clearly if C1 and
C2 are diverging persons, qualitatively exactly the same up to time t but not
after, neither at t can know which of them he is. Each is uncertain as to what he
will see after t. The semantics we are proposing applies here as with branching.
Yet Lewis was at pains, in On the Plurality of Worlds, to distinguish branching
from divergence.
Of course diverging persons in a non-branching world are not seriously com-
parable to branching persons in a non-branching world. The two are obser-
vationally entirely distinct diverging persons do not have to undergo surgery
or cloning, for example. These are respects in which branching and divergence
clearly di¤er. But shift our topic to worlds as wholes and the di¤erence between
branching and diverging worlds, on the semantics we propose, is considerably
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more subtle. There is no longer any question of any observational distinction
between the two.
Our claim (on the semantics we propose) is that rather large swathes of ordi-
nary discourse now come out as true, whether worlds branch or merely diverge.
Indeed, as Lewis recognized, when it comes to the initial segments of diverging
worlds the relation of similarityex hypothesi holds exactly; and as such it is
transitive as well as reexive and symmetric. For such segments, the formal dis-
crepancy between similarity and identity disappears (Lewis [1986 p.209]). That
observation e¤ectively neutralizes the intuition that talk of branching must show
up linguistically as di¤erent from talk of divergence. The salient distinction, be-
tween similar and identical initial segments, is invisible at the level of syntax
and logical form.
Lewis has two objections to branching worlds. The rst is that it makes
nonsense of ordinary beliefs about the future: instead one has to say (to use
Aristotles example), supposing that after branching in one world there is a sea
battle, but not in the other, that there is a sea battle tomorrow and there is no
sea battle tomorrow; or, perhaps, that there is nothing at all tomorrow because
one doesnt have a unique tomorrow and so on, for various other semantics.
In ever case he considered, he found the result decient either strange or ap-
parently self-contradictory. Denizens of such worlds, he concluded for Lewis
allows that the notion of branchingis physically meaningful, at some level, so
there are such worlds out there in logical space will be epistemically unfortu-
nate, and, if they speak like us, deeply confused. We, thankfully, are not in their
position (although presumably our world is diverging from countless others, in
logical space).
But this problem, we hope, we are slowly dispelling. Lewis here as in the
context of personal ssion overlooked the semantics that we have given. On our
semantics branching into the future brings with it nothing stranger than the
notion of uncertainty. It is a conservative semantics in which ordinary beliefs
about the future come out as true.
Lewiss second objection to branching worlds is that they are of no use to
modal discourse, or not if taken as providing de re transworld identities of
the sort sometimes wanted by metaphysicians. Thus, if what is possible for
C are the properties that C has in all possible worlds that contain C, then
C has all its intrinsic properties in all worlds possible for C so none of its
intrinsic properties (which do not depend on relations with other things) can be
accidental. He called this the problem of accidental intrinsics.
Evidently the problem only arises if de re identity is to play a central role
in accounting for possibility. As such, again it is a problem that can be stated
for diverging worlds as well (replacing identity by exact similarity): if what is
possible for C are the properties that C has in all possible worlds in which it
has an exactly similar counterpart, the same unwelcome result follows. There
is, however, a di¤erence. Under divergence, the antecedent of the conditional
has a natural weakening to approximate similarity, whereupon the consequent
no longer follows. Allow that the properties possible for C are the properties
of approximately similar counterparts to C, and the di¢ culty disappears. But
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this trick will hardly work with identity, for what could approximate identity
possibly mean?
There may of course be other tricks that work with identity (hence with
exact similarity). In fact one is rather promising: C might have had Pis true
if and only if C has a temporal part that is a temporal part of a continuant
Cthat has P (in terms of exact similarity, ....if C has a temporal part that is
exactly similar to a temporal part...). Thus Al Gore might have won the 2000
US presidential election, if he has a temporal part which is a part of a person
who won.
Simpler still is to suppose de re identities play no particular role in ones
treatment of the modalities, just as Lewis makes no particular use of exact
similarities in his. But that undercuts what is supposed to be the principal
attraction of the picture of branching worlds, which is precisely that it promises
to provide the needed de re identities. Combine this with the worry about
making nonsense of ordinary beliefs about the future, and it is understandable
that branching worlds have never been much in favour, not even among those
who, like Lewis, believe all possible worlds to be real. (Of course antirealists
about possible worlds never so much as consider branching worlds, or exactly
similar worlds for the real world cannot be exactly similar to an ersatz world.)
One can put the matter in terms of tensed identity. Branching and diverg-
ing worlds are made to look the same using tensed identity. Elsewhere Lewis
wrote of tensed identity as a somewhat unnatural and ad hoc device (Lewis
[1986 pp.218-9]) as applied to branching within a world, but in that case, post-
branching, the number of branches is directly observable. We have already
remarked on this no such observations are available if it is worlds as wholes
that branch, no more so than if they merely diverge. All the more reason, then,
to count by tensed identity not just persons, but things and worlds themselves.
There is no doubt that if Al Gore had won the election he would have tried to
save the Amazonian rainforest. Which rainforest would that be, exactly? why,
his rainforest, the one in the world in which he was elected. So there is no
doubt about how many rainforests Al Gore was trying to save: just the one, his
own the same number as by counting with tensed identity.
That would seem to suggest that things are not denizens of more than one
world after all. Didnt we say that branching as opposed to divergence brings
with it de re identities? There is no formal contradiction; the de re identities
we made use of were of temporal parts, not things; but we seem to end up with
the di¢ culty, on our semantics, of putting the very doctrine we are interested in
into ordinary words (it appears to require metaphysically technical terms, like
temporal parts; it appears purely metaphysical). And there are other puzzles
that naturally arise: what of the uncertainty involved in branching (equivalently
with divergence) does it comes in degrees? If so, presumably it brings with it
the notion of probability what are these probabilities, exactly, and what have
they to do with any statistical data? And what about the converse of branching
and divergence, namely recombination and convergence of worlds?
These are deep waters for metaphysicians. No wonder branching has been
looked on with suspicion by all parties to the debate (although as we have seen
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many of the same questions arise with divergence). All parties, that is, save
one.
3 Physics
What if one takes seriously modern physics, and specically, the most success-
ful fundamental theory of modern physics, quantum mechanics? For quantum
mechanics, under the only interpretation to date that can lay claim to being
a realist interpretation (the only interpretation under which we have a service-
able universal theory at all), appears to be saying that the world is constantly
branching if not branching into all possible worlds, then branching into all
physically possible worlds. And it appears to be saying that it is ubiquitously
a branching process, not a recombining or converging of worlds, at least at the
macroscopic level.
That theory is Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM). We earlier said the
conventional theory includes the measurement postulates: it is the latter that
pose problems for realism. They are clearly unsatisfactory as dynamical princi-
ples, however, in certain circumstances, that is just what they must clearly be
(the infamous projection postulate). Stated as they are in terms of measure-
mentor observation(or the observer) or, as in the more recent literature,
in terms of a choice of a decoherent history space they appear variously as
out-and-out instrumentalism, idealism, or as requiring top-down causation. Re-
alists would like to do better yet without some such device as the measurement
postulates, it seems impossible to account for or even so much as describe the
events actually observed.
This problem (the problem of measurement) has of course an enormous
literature, but a consensus of sorts has emerged. It is that if EQM hangs in
the balance and may ultimately fail, whether on the basis of the incoherence
problem, that we are currently pursuing, or some other two other approaches
are agreed by almost all to be credible, namely adding hidden variables obeying
supplementary equations, or changing the dynamical equations for the wave-
function. What results, in either case, is a new theory not an interpretation
of the existing formalism whether a hidden-variable theory, or a dynamical
collapse theory, or (perhaps) a combination of the two. There are successful
theories of the rst and second type, although restricted to the non-relativistic
regime, namely the dBB theory (de Broglie-Bohm theory, also called pilot-wave
theory and Bohmian mechanics) and the GRW theory (after Ghirardi, Rimini,
and Weber).
In all three theories, EQM, dBB, and GRW, the fundamental ontology is the
universal state (the wave-function of the universe), a function on a space of
enormously high (and in quantum eld theory innite) dimensionality. Extract-
ing interesting structures from this wave-function structures which in their
macroscopic features look like the observable universe is the business of deco-
herence theory, in EQM and (in the decoherent histories formalism) in standard
quantum mechanics. What results in the latter cases is a quasi-classical de-
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cohering history space, representing the evolving wave function as a system of
branching worlds. In the dBB theory one has precisely this same structure
the fundamental equations for the state are unchanged but in addition to this
there is a particular sequence of particle congurations deterministically thread-
ing through (and thereby picking out) a single branch in this history space. In
GRW theory the equations are changed, but precisely so as to rapidly suppress
(collapse) all save one of the branches by a stochastic dynamical process.
In dBB the probabilities concern the values of the hidden-variables (they are
like probabilities in classical statistical mechanics, whatever they are), whereas
in GRW they enter in the new stochastic dynamics controlling the collapses. In
both cases one is ignorant of the precise nature of the one and only branch
that is actually realized. A notion of probability, then, is available as degree
of belief, or likelihood, of one branch arising rather than some other: as to
how it will go with the way things are objectively arranged. Curiously, in
both theories, these degrees of belief are to be carefully matched to the values
of certain perfectly denite quantities in the branching structure to the way
things are objectively arranged namely to the branch weights, the modulus
squares of the amplitudes of the components of the wave-function, referred to
the quasiclassical history space. No reason is given for this, other than that it
works on empirical grounds.
What probabilities mean in EQM (if they mean anything at all) is of course
the question we are examining the incoherence problem. If there is ignorance
and uncertainty, then it is not like ignorance and uncertainty in GRW and dBB
theories, which is about the way the universe is arranged at the fundamental
level. In EQM (as in dBB and GRW) we suppose the wave-function is completely
known at some time, but (like GRW but not dBB) since there is no other
fundamental ontology, there is no further ignorance and unlike GRW, since
the equations are deterministic, there is no ignorance of the future either. So
what in EQM is the source of ignorance and uncertainty?
Step back, at this point, from the details of these theories. EQM, in broad
brush, says that worlds are subject to branching, and that branches come with
weights quantities whose sum is preserved under branching. As a metaphysical
picture, it is precisely the one considered in Section 2.2, save that we have
these additional quantities, weights. The incoherence objection is in e¤ect that
this picture makes no epistemic or metaphysical sense, at least not in terms of
probability. One might have expected to nd a verdict on this objection in the
philosophical literature, but branching as we have seen has been largely ignored
by metaphysicians, whilst weighted branching is unheard of. No postulate of
this kind could ever have been seriously presented by a metaphysician as an a
priori hypothesis about modal space; it has too much of the avour of a physical
theory. So, alas, we learn little of direct relevance to this objection from the
metaphysicians.
In any case, now that we are coming at this metaphysical picture as a theory
of physics, the nature of the argument, on both sides, is transformed. As goes
the incoherence problem of EQM, it is now rather clear, from Section 2, of
what we are ignorant: we dont know which world which branch, big-bang to
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end-of-time is ours. It is lack of knowledge de se, uncertainty of where we
are located, not as a stage S but as a world-stage hW;Si or world-time hW; ti,
among the branching worlds. Ignorance on this score makes rather obvious
sense in the case of diverging worlds, and now we are in a position to see that
it makes just as much sense, on our semantics, in the case of branching worlds.
That is, on our semantics, much the same sentences in much the same linguistic
contexts have much the same truth values, whether worlds are branching or
merely diverging (high-level theoretical sentences, like worlds diverge and do
not branchor worlds are branches of a decohering history space, do not count).
This ignorance is more like GRW ignorance than dBB, where there is something
(the values of the hidden variables) which are in principle unobservable. In
EQM, as in GRW, even knowing everything there is to know up to t, ones
future is still unknown.
The argument is transformed on the side of metaphysics as well. As we
concluded in Section 2, some serious questions remained most notably the
worry as to how to characterize branching itself, of how to quantify these self-
locating uncertainties, and of what to say about recombination, respectively
convergence.
Stating the theory is now not a problem: whatever expressions of it in
everyday words may or may not be possible, in accordance with our seman-
tics, we now have available the language of quantum mechanics too. Com-
pare four-dimensionalism, and the di¢ culty of stating that doctrine in everyday
words, under a semantics which preserves the truth of ordinary talk of change.
(For the parallels between disputes over branching, re uncertainty, and four-
dimensionalism, re becoming, see Saunders ([1995], [1998]) and, in terms of
radical translation, Wallace [2005].)
As for how to quantify probabilities, branch-weights which are equivariant
(whose sum is preserved by the dynamics), quantities never considered in the
philosophy literature, are just the ticket. More than that, a potential rival
probability measure, which actually leads to severe problems with diachronic
consistency to take the worlds produced on branching to be equiprobable is
revealed as a will othe wisp, relying on numbers that arent even approximately
dened by dynamical considerations (they are rather dened by the number of
kinds of outcome, oblivious to the number of outcomes of each kind). This point
has been made a number of times in the literature (see e.g. Saunders [1998],
Wallace [2003]), although it is often ignored or forgotten. Thus Lewis ([2004]), in
his one foray into quantum mechanics (published posthumously), and Putnam
([2005 pp.630-1]), in a reprise of his earlier famous paper A Philosopher Looks
at Quantum Mechanics, made much of this supposed alternative to branch
weights in quantifying probability. (See Saunders [2005], Wallace [2007] for
recent and detailed criticisms on this putative probability measure.)
Finally, worries about how to handle recombination (branching worlds) and
convergence (diverging worlds) now have a rather di¤erent character. Recom-
bination, where it can be realized, is quantum erasure, and is (at least to date)
common ground to EQM as to the standard formalism. Insofar as it may be
predicted in novel circumstances by EQM, it is likely to lead to novel experi-
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ments.
Such are the virtues of naturalized over a prioristic metaphysics.
4 Objections
It will not do, in this changed situation, to object that the semantics we have
introduced is counter-intuitive: intuition, if we are talking of physical discover-
ies, doesnt come into it. Nor does it matter if there is some other, alternative
semantics to ours in the branching case, according to which the incoherence
problem remains. Of course there is; our goal was to nd a semantics in which
it is solved. We are not looking for deep metaphysical truths about identity, the
referent of I, the nature of persons, and so on; we are looking for serviceability.
We do not, in particular, accept that there is a correct semantics, whether
or not consistent with ours, as determined by metaphysical principles. For we
do not believe there are any metaphysical truths when it comes to the meanings
of everyday words like personand I, over and above those that are xed by
observable linguistic useage. Our picture of the meanings of words like these is
like Quines: giving truth conditions for their use, in terms of our best physical
theory, is similar to compiling a manual of translation, subject to the principle
of charity. That and ease of use, clarity, and consistency, are for us the only
relevant criteria. Our proposal, on none of these criteria, is in contention. Our
rules are too simple to harbour concealed contradictions.
Is it a worry that our proposed semantics may lead to revisions, if EQM
is true, of truths customarily assumed in testing and conrming quantum me-
chanics (or any physical theory) in the rst place? That would be a serious
di¢ culty if it were true. But to guard against this is a principal rational for the
principle of charity, insofar as it is can be applied under theory change. Call it
conservativism, the principle of charity, or the principle of minimal mutilation,
the upshot is the same. From the beginning our goal was to show that EQM
can be defended against the incoherence objection.
Is it that the semantics, qua an account of meaning and reference, violates
customary norms and principles in the philosophy of language and philosophical
logic? That too would be damaging if true, if somewhat less so than the case
just considered, as not directly self-undermining. But is it true? Apparently
not from the point of view of philosophical language: the semantics is bivalent;
utterances are attributed to persons; and the referents of personal pronouns are
context-dependent, depending (at least in part) on the utterer of the sentence
in which they appear. Nor does it appear true from the point of view of philos-
ophy of language, for its salient features are these: meanings are determined by
global linguistic usage, rather than by metaphysical principles; not all knowl-
edge is propositional; not all content of thought is narrow content. These are
all standard principles.
To conclude: if as Lewis proposes in cases of personal branching we say
there are two persons present even before the branch, it is at least somewhat
natural to attribute two sets of thoughts to those persons; in the case of worlds
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branching, it becomes entirely natural. As a result, talk of uncertainty in the
face of branching comes out as true. Whether or not branching thereby nds new
applications in modal metaphysics is an open question, but since our best theo-
ries of physics seem to describe branching worlds, it nds a natural application
to the physical universe.
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